In this paper, Nash-type games problems with set payoff (for short, NGPSP) are first introduced. Then, in terms of the measure of noncompactness, some well-posedness results for Nash-type games problems with set payoff are obtained in Banach spaces.
Introduction and Preliminaries
It is well known that well-posedness plays an important role in the stability theory for optimization problems. The concept of well-posedness was first introduced by Tykhonov in [14] . Since then, some extensions of this concept for vector optimization problems and minimization problems appeared. For details, we refer readers to [8, 9] and the references therein. Moreover, the concept of well-posedness has been generalized to nonconvex constrained variational problems, variational inequality problems, generalized variational inequality problems and equilibrium problems, see [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17] and the reference therein.
Game theory has played an important role in the many fields, such as economics, management and operations research. Games problems have three elements: players, strategies of players and payoffs functions. However, it is difficult to know the exact values of payoffs owing to some unexpected situations. We can only give an estimate of values of payoffs. Therefore, games problems with set payoff become an interesting research topic.
Throughout this paper, let I be a finite index set and for each i ∈ I, let X i be a real Banach space, let Y i be a real Banach space with proper closed convex cone C i , and intC i = ∅. For each i ∈ I, X = i∈I X i ,
For each x ∈ X, suppose that x i and x i denote the i th coordinate of x and the projection of x on X i , respectively. In this paper, we may write x = (x i , x i ). We introduce the following Nash-type games problems with set payoff: the game problem is to findx = (x) i∈I ∈ X,ȳ i ∈ F i (x i ,x i ) such that for each i ∈ I,x i ∈ S i (x i ), and
(ii) For each i ∈ I, if F i is a real-valued function, the problem reduces to the Nash-type game problem with real-valued payoff functions in [13] .
Motivated by the earlier work, we introduce the well-posedness for (NGPSP) and some wellposedness results for (NGPSP) are obtained by using the measure of noncompactness.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the concepts of wellposedness and approximate solution set. In Section 3, we establish some metric characterizations for well-posedness by using the measure of noncompactness.
In this paper, We assume that the set of solutions for (NGPSP) is always nonempty, denoted by Q. Let e i ∈ intC i , i ∈ I. Now, we introduce the definitions of approximate solution sequences and well-posedness for (NGPSP). . Let X and Y be two normed spaces. A set-valued mapping G from X to Y is called (i) closed if for every x ∈ X, for every sequence {x n } converging to x, and for every sequence {y n } converging to a point y, such that y n ∈ G(x n ), ∀n ∈ N , one has y ∈ G(x); (ii) subcontinuous on X if for every convergent sequence {x n } converging to x, every sequence {y n } with y n ∈ G(x n ), {y n } has a convergent subsequence; (iii) upper semicontinuous (u.s.c.) if for every x ∈ X, if for any neighborhood
there exists a neighborhood N (x) of x such that
(iv) lower semicontinuous (l.s.c.) if for every x ∈ X, for every sequence {x n } converging to x, and for every y ∈ G(x), there exists a sequence {y n } converging to y, such that y n ∈ G(x n ) ∀n ∈ N ; (v) continuous at x 0 ∈ X if G is both u.s.c. and l.s.c. at x 0 .
Main results
In this section, we shall give characterizations for well-posedness of (NGPSP). First, we present the Kuratowski measure of noncompactness for a nonempty subset B of X ( [9] ) defined by
where diam(B i ) be the diameter of B i defined by In order to study the well-posedness for (NEP), we introduce the approximate solution set for (NGPSP) which is defined by
, ∀i ∈ I}, where > 0. For the sake of simplicity, we restrict ourselves to I = {1, 2}. But the result can be easily obtained for finite players. Moreover, if the following conditions are satisfied: Proof. If (NGPSP) is well-posed, then the set Q is a singleton. Q is always nonempty for every , since Q ⊆ Q . By contradiction, assume that lim n→0 diamQ n > β > 0, for some sequence { n } ⊆ R + 1 . We could find two sequences {(x n ) i∈I } and {(z n ) i∈I } satisfying x n ∈ Q n , z n ∈ Q n and x n − z n > β, for n large enough. Since {x n }, {z n } are approximate solutions for (NGPSP) and should converge to the unique solution, we get a contradiction with the assumption. Now, we assume that (2.1) holds and {x n = (x n1 , x n2 )} ⊆ X is an approximate solution sequence for (NGPSP). Then there exists a sequence {t n } ⊆ R + 1 decreasing to 0, such that
According to the assumption, we conclude that {x n } is a Cauchy sequence and has to converge to some pointx = (x 1 ,x 2 ) ∈ X. Next, we only need to show thatx ∈ Q.
From (2.2), we get that
, for each n ∈ N . Since S 1 is (τ, σ)-closed and (τ, σ)-subcontinuous, the sequence {η n1 } has a subsequence, still denoted by {η n1 }, which converges to a point η 1 ∈ S 1 (x 2 ). It follows that
We have
. Similarly, we can get thatx 2 ∈ S 2 (x 1 ).
For each i ∈ I, in the light of (2.3) and assumption (i), the sequence {ȳ ni } have subsequences which converge toȳ i ∈ F i (x i ,x i ). For all u i ∈ S i (x i ), since S i is (τ, σ)-lower semicontinuous, there exists a sequence {u ni } converging to u i such that u ni ∈ S i (x i n ) ∀n ∈ N . And for all y i ∈ F i (x i , u i ), by virtue of the continuity and compactness of F i , there exists y ni satisfying
The uniqueness follows immediately from (2.1). Thus, we complete the proof. Now we obtain an characterization for generalized well-posedness for (NGPSP) by using the Kuratowski measure. Moreover, assume the following conditions hold: Proof. Let (NGPSP) be well-posed in the generalized sense, then Q is nonempty and compact. Obviously, Q = ∅ for any > 0, since Q ⊆ Q . If {x n } i∈I is a sequence of Nash equilibria, it is also approximate solution sequence. By virtue of assumption, {x n } contains a subsequence converging to a Nash equilibrium. In the following, we show that lim n α(Q n ) = 0 for every n decreasing to 0.
Observe that H(Q n , Q) = max{e(Q n , Q), e(Q, Q n )} = e(Q n , Q).
where α(Q) = 0, since Q is compact. To get (2.4), it is sufficient to show that
Suppose that lim n sup x∈Q n d(x, Q) > γ > 0. Then, there exits a positive integer k and x n ∈ Q n satisfying d(x n , Q) > γ for arbitrary n ≥ k. So, the sequence {x n } has no subsequence converging to a point of Q, which contradicts the assumption. Conversely, we assume that (2.4) holds. We follow the proof of Theorem 2.2 that Q is closed. By the Kuratowski theorem, we have
where Q = >0 Q is nonempty and compact. Let {x n } be any approximate solution sequence for (NGPSP). Then there exists n ≥ 0 with n → 0 such that {x n } ⊆ Q n . Due to (2.5), d(x n , Q) → 0. Then, there exits a sequence {p n } i∈I ∈ Q such that d(x n , p n ) = x n − p n → 0. As Q is compact, the sequence {p n } has a subsequence {p n k } converging top ∈ Q. We could easily obtain that {x n } has a subsequence converging top. Therefore, (NGPSP) is well-posed in the generalized sense.
If for each i ∈ I, F i is single-valued function, denoted by f i , Y i = R and S i (X i ) = X i , the Nash equilibrium problem is to findx = (x) i∈I ∈ X, such that for each i ∈ I,x i ∈ X i and f i (x i ,x i ) ≤ f i (x i , z i ), for all z i ∈ X i .
Remark 2.4. In [13] , the following Nash games problems with real-valued payoff is studied. A point x = (x 1 ,x 2 ) ∈ X 1 × X 2 is a Nash equilibrium if: f 1 (x 1 ,x 2 ) ≤ f 1 (z 1 ,x 2 ), ∀z 1 ∈ X 1 ; and f 2 (x 1 ,x 2 ) ≤ f 1 (x 1 , z 2 ), ∀z 2 ∈ X 2 , where f i : X 1 × X 2 → R ∪ {+∞}.
For the above Nash-type games problems with real-valued payoff, we introduce the following similar definitions of approximate solutions sequence and approximate solution set. LetQ denotes the solution set of the above problem. 
